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Abstract. Modern society is becoming increasingly reliant on secure
computer systems. Predicting which vulnerabilities are more likely to
be exploited by malicious actors is therefore an important task to help
prevent cyber attacks. Researchers have tried making such predictions
using machine learning. However, recent research has shown that the
evaluation of such models require special sampling of training and test
sets, and that previous models would have had limited utility in real
world settings. This study further develops the results of recent research
through the use of their sampling technique for evaluation in combina-
tion with a novel data model. Moreover, contrary to recent research, we
find that using open web data can help in making better predictions
about exploits, and that zero-day exploits are detrimental to the predic-
tive powers of the model. Finally, we discovered that the initial days of
vulnerability information is sufficient to make the best possible model.
Given our findings, we suggest that more research should be devoted
to develop refined techniques for building predictive models for exploits.
Gaining more knowledge in this domain would not only help preventing
cyber attacks but could yield fruitful insights in the nature of exploit
development.
Keywords: exploits · machine learning · concept drift · vulnerability
management.
1 Introduction
Every year, thousands of vulnerabilities are published. Most of these vulnerabili-
ties are benign and never exploited. As an example, in 2017, 12 561 vulnerabilities
were published with Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers,
the industry standard of identifying vulnerabilities. Only 11% of these vulnerabil-
ities had proof-of-concept exploits attached to them, and only a fraction of these
exploits would ever actively be used in the wild. Since patching a vulnerability
is time consuming and costly, security teams have to triage the vulnerabilities
found in their system and patch the most critical vulnerabilities first. The CVSS
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score has been a common tool for assessing the severity of a vulnerability. How-
ever, previous studies have shown that CVSS scores are not ideal indicators for
which vulnerabilities are in need of patching [1].
Machine learning models could possibly be a good tool to use as a proxy of
likelihood of exploitation. The topic has been studied in academia for many years
but only recently gained traction in industry [11]. Having a functional machine
learning model would not only alleviate the manual labour involved in sorting
through the large volume of vulnerability information, but could potentially
provide valuable insight in the nature of exploitation.
Although many researchers have built machine learning models for exploit
prediction, recent research by Bullough et al. [3] has shown that the promising
results obtained in previous research [2, 12, 5] were most likely an artifact of
unrealistic treatment of data.
The goal of this study was to develop an understanding for how machine
learning models are affected by different assumptions about the data. Using a
novel method to aggregate data that accurately reflects knowledge about vul-
nerabilities prior to their exploitation, we make the following contributions:
– We confirm Bullough et al.’s result that the data undergoes concept drift for
samples collected during the time period 2015 to early 2018.
– We find that using online web chatter about vulnerabilities has a positive im-
pact on exploit prediction, and that zero-day vulnerabilities are detrimental
to the model’s performance.
– We discover that the early information about vulnerabilities is sufficient to
make the best possible prediction.
In Section 2, we outline previous work on predicting exploits using machine
learning. In Section 3, we describe our approach and give an overview of how
we treat the data. In Section 4, we describe our four experiments and present
their results. In Section 5, we briefly discuss our findings. Finally, in Section 6,
we give some concluding remarks.
2 Challenges and Related Work
This section will cover some pitfalls with making a predictive model for exploits
as well how researchers have tried to handle those problems. We limit this section
to the main related work [3, 5, 12] and discuss challenges that they faced in detail.
2.1 Realistic Data Aggregation
An important task when predicting future exploitation events is to assemble
data that excludes information after the vulnerability has been exploited. Since
most vulnerability databases update their data continuously, previous research
[3, 5] has tried to redact the data to, for example, exclude references to exploit
databases. However, aggregating the correct data without knowing when some-
thing has been changed or what has been changed quickly becomes infeasable.
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This practice comes with no guarantees that the vulnerability entries contain
the same information as it did before it was published in an exploit database.
To combat this challenge, in this work we use NVD’s change log to backtrack
changes to approximately 8 days after publication in NVD. This way, our data is
representative of the knowledge of vulnerabilities before they became exploited.
For more details on how this was done, see Section 3.1.
2.2 Temporal Intermixing and Realistic Evaluation
Previous research has indicated that designing classifiers for exploit prediction
requires careful sampling of the training and test sets that respects time [3]. This
result was attributed to concept drift, a phenomenon which is often observed in
predictive models where the relationship between predictor variables and labels,
i.e. concepts, changes over time [13, 8]. Most of previous researchers has assumed
that sampling of training and test sets do not have to respect time. Some have
assumed this explicitly [12], some have assumed this implicitly [2, 5].
This study will try and recreate previous research [3] by conducting similar
experiments. These experiments are outlined in Section 3.
3 Approach
To better understand what data is needed to make good predictions on exploits,
we have designed two methods of aggregating data. These methods are outlined
in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we give the reader an overview of our data and
our feature engineering. Section 3.3 provides information on how we split the
training and test data and how we labeled our data. Section 3.4 covers how we
configured and tuned model parameters.
3.1 The Models
In the following section we describe the two models we designed that we call the
naive and the realistic model.
The naive model was constructed from the data provided by NVD “as-is”,
which is how the data has been used in previous research [3, 5, 12]. This model
collects NVD data and web chatter for an extended amount of time. The main
issue with this model is that it keeps collecting data even after the exploitation
event. Collecting information after that event will “leak“ information about the
future to the past. As such, the model cannot realistically be used for making
predictions about the future.
As an alternative, we introduce our realistic model that limits aggregation
by a cut-off time equal to the median number of days from NVD publication
to Exploit DB publication. In the following sections, we use ti,s to denote the
starting time of data aggregation of vulnerability i and ti,f to denote the finishing
time of data aggregation of vulnerability i.
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Naive Model To compare the realistic model to related work on predicting
exploits, we designed the naive model which aggregates data as long as a vul-
nerability is active in the NVD database.
The naive model starts aggregating data from the day of the initial NVD
publication for each vulnerability i. As we have stated before, we call this day
ti,s. The final day for aggregating data, ti,f , is the date of last modification of
vulnerability i. Notice that this model will keep aggregating data even if the
vulnerability has been exploited. A schematic of this data aggregation can be
seen in Figure 1.
First Public Mention Publication Day Last Modified Day
ytisne
D rett ahC be
W
Time
Discard Keep Discard
Day of Exploit Event
ti,s ti,f
Fig. 1. This illustration shows during which period we aggregate data for vulnerabilities
in the naive model.
Realistic Model In the realistic model, illustrated in Figure 2, we are more
careful with how we aggregate data. For each vulnerability i, we set the first day
of aggregation, ti,s (seen as the blue dashed line in Figure 2), to be the day of
first recorded web mention.
If a vulnerability has been exploited the last day of aggregation ti,f is set
to the day of exploitation (dark green dashed line in Figure 2). However, the
majority of vulnerabilities do not get exploited. In that case, ti,f is set to ti,s+n
′
where n′ is equal to the median number of days to exploitation from the first
recorded web mention. The statistic n′ is calculated by taking the median number
of days to exploitation for all exploited vulnerabilities in the data. The median
statistic is used as it is less influenced by outliers. In the exceptional case where
NVD has not had time to publish the vulnerability n′ days after the first recorded
web mention, ti,f is set to the day of NVD publication.
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Notice that the cut-off n′ is in general the same across all vulnerabilities. This
gives each vulnerability approximately the same amount of time to collect data,
which is important to avoid creating biases in the data. For example, features
such as number of days since published, will in the naive model be large for
vulnerabilities that stay relevant for longer periods of time which is usually the
case for exploited vulnerabilities.
yti sne
D r ett ahC be
W
Keep Discard
Exploit-Event 
First Public Mention Cut-Off Time
ti,s ti,f
Fig. 2. This illustration shows how we set the cut-off day for collecting data for indi-
vidual vulnerabilities in the realistic model.
3.2 Data Collections and Feature Engineering
To construct a machine learning algorithm, data was aggregated from three
sources and then combined together using the Common Vulnerabilities and Ex-
posures Identifier. In the following sections, we will describe each of the data
sources along with their contributions of features for the machine learning algo-
rithm. A complete summary of the features that were used in the algorithm can
be seen in Table 1.
Vulnerabilities Each entry in the first collection is a vulnerability that has been
assigned a unique CVE-ID and has been published in the NVD database [9]. We
took the vulnerability descriptions and converted them into a term frequency
inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) matrix. We also used the CVSS data by
converting categorical features using a one-hot encoding and rescaling numer-
ical features to standard normal distributions. Moreover, we constructed a set
of features for the most common sources of references. These features encode
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the spread of references across web sites that report and document vulnerabil-
ities. For the naive model, we also calculate the number of active days of the
vulnerability.
Web Chatter The second collection, called the web chatter collection, consists
of fragments of text that has been published online with at least one mention of a
vulnerability present in our vulnerabilities collection. The data in this collection
was provided by Recorded Future’s cyber threat intelligence platform [10], which
actively scrapes many relevant sources of vulnerability information. Twitter,
GitHub and CERT announcements make up approximately 50% of the data in
this collection. The other 50% was collected from roughly 9 500 miscellaneous
sources such as paste bins, security forums and other cyber security information
platforms. The text fragments where later aggregated on CVE-ID and converted
into a TF-IDF matrix. Moreover, we also constructed a set of features that
encode the spread between languages and sources of web chatter.
Exploits The data contained in the third collection are exploits published on
Exploit Database’s (Exploit DB) website [6]. Each entry in this collection is an
exploit that mentions one or more vulnerabilities found in our vulnerabilities
collection. Other exploit sources such as exploit kits, studied by for example
Allodi et al. [1], were initially considered but ruled out as their acquisition is
cumbersome and resulting models would not have been comparable with previous
research.
Table 1. The features in our data set for both the naive and realistic model during a
run in February 2018.
Source
Data
Category Raw Data Modelled as
NVD
References List of URLs Fraction of Common Sources
Nr. References Num. Scaled to N(0, 1)
CVSS Data
Cat. One-hot Encoding
Num. Scaled to N(0, 1)
Description Text TF-IDF
CWE data Multi. Cat. Binary Vector
Published Date Date
Time difference
Modified Date Date
Web Chatter
Source URLs List of URLs Fraction of Common Sources
Nr. Source URLs Num. Scaled to N(0, 1)
Source Language List of Languages Fraction of Common Languages
Captured Text Text TF-IDF
Exploit
Label CVE-ID 1 ⇔ CVE-ID ∈ EDB
Publication Date Date Not in data frame
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3.3 Training Sets, Test Sets and Labels
The training and test sets for both the naive and the realistic model have been
split in such a way that the training set contains past events and the test set
contains future events (relative to the training set). For example, using this
model we could be training on last year’s vulnerabilities to predict the next
month’s exploits.
To split the data in future and past events, we set a cut-off day d′, which
one can interpret as the “present day” of the model. This parameter is chosen
to achieve an 80/20 split of training and test samples.
As shown in Figure 3, given a cut-off day d′, a start of a vulnerability ti,s
and an end of a vulnerability ti,f , there are three cases which determine if a
vulnerability ends up in the training or the test set. Any vulnerability that is
a past event relative to the cut off day d′ is put in the training set (case 1).
Any vulnerability that is an ongoing vulnerability relative to the cut off day d′
is pruned from the model (case 2). We do this in an effort to keep the model
realistic as we do not want to train the model on an event that has not yet been
concluded. Finally, the future events relative to the cut off d′ are put in the test
set (case 3). These future events are then used to evaluate the performance of
our model.
Time
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ty
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Cut-Off
ti,s ti,f
Test
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Start End
Fig. 3. Figure shows how training and test sets have been split for both the naive and
the realistic model.
Labels for supervised learning are created in the following way:
yi =
{
1⇔ i ∈ EDB
0 otherwise
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where i is a vulnerability identified by its CVE-ID. This means that any vulner-
ability found in the exploit collection is labeled as exploited.
Table 2 displays the training and test split that we used for our data along
with the number of samples and the positive and negative class percentage. For
this realization of our data set, we used d′ = 2017-08-08 as our training-test split
parameter.
Table 2. Information about the training and test split with d′ set to 2017-08-08.
Nr. Samples Naive Nr. Exploited Realistic Nr. Exploited
Total 24944 809 (3.2%) 24323 809 (3.3%)
Training (Case 1) 19644 719 (3.6%) 19146 719 (3.8%)
Dropped (Case 2) 179 3 (1.7%) 72 3 (4.2%)
Testing (Case 3) 5121 87 (1.7%) 5105 87 (1.7%)
3.4 Supervised Learning Algorithm and Optimization
To perform supervised learning, we choose the eXtreme Gradient Boosting pack-
age (xgboost) [4] as it is generally known to produce good results on imbalanced
data sets. This implementation is based on the gradient boosting algorithm de-
signed by Friedman et al. [7] which is an ensemble model that typically uses
decision trees as predictors.
The choice of hyper-parameters were the result of a grid search, optimizing
for highest F1 across a 5-fold cross-validation on the training set. The resulting
parameters and ranges for the grid search can be seen in Table 3.
For the training phase of our model we optimize for maximum F1 score using
validation hold out. The validation set is a 10% stratified random subset of the
training set.
Table 3. Parameters used for our eXtreme gradient boosting algorithm, and the range
for hyper-parameter tuning using grid search.
η γ depth
Naive 0.1 0.8 7
Realistic 0.2 0 8
Grid Search Range for Tuning [0.1, 1] by 0.1 [0, 3] by 0.2 [4, 8] by 1
4 Results
In the following sections, we outline our experiments and study their respective
impact on a baseline model described in Section 4.1. The goal of these experi-
ments, which have been inspired by the work of Bullough et al. [3], is to develop
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an understanding for how different modelling practices affect the results of our
classification algorithm. We apply these experiments to both the naive model
and the realistic model to see whether the outcome is due to how the data is
aggregated. The results of the classifiers are presented as precision and recall
plots, which have been derived by obtaining precision and recall values from
sweeping through the estimated likelihood values provided by the classifier.
4.1 Experiment 0: The Baseline Models
To have something to compare our experiments against, we made baseline mod-
els that were not subjected to any of the experiments outlined in the coming
sections. The baseline models use the following assumptions.
– No zero-day exploits in the data.
– The training and test set are temporally separated with d′ = 2017-08-08 as
the separating day.
– Data include web-chatter features.
This is our best effort to modelling the problem as accurately as possible with-
out any known form of faulty assumptions or unrealistic performance boosts. The
baseline models are used for comparison in each experiment, and their respective
precision and recall values can be seen as the orange lines in the precision and
recall plots of each experiment, which are presented in sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
In Table 4, we present the maximum F1 score for the naive and realistic
baseline models, and in Figure 4 we compare their precision and recall curves.
As seen in Table 4, the naive model has a lower maximum F1 score than the
realistic model, and in Figure 4, we observe that the naive model has worse over
all performance since it has less precision for matching values of recall. This
result suggests that the first 8 days is enough to make predictive models for
exploits, realistic or not.
Table 4. The maximum F1 score of the naive and realistic baseline models with their
corresponding precision and recall values.
Naive Realistic
Precision 0.525 0.578
Recall 0.333 0.458
F1 Score 0.407 0.511
4.2 Experiment I: Including Zero-Day Exploits
To make predictions about future events, we have to exclude zero-day vulner-
abilities from our data set as these are announced after the exploit event has
occurred and cannot be predicted in a meaningful way.
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Fig. 4. Direct comparison of the classification performance for the naive and the real-
istic model.
Any exploit where ti,e ≤ ti,s for vulnerability i is considered a zero-day
exploit, where ti,e is the time of exploitation. In practical terms, this means
that any exploit published in EDB prior to publication in NVD is considered a
zero-day exploit. In this experiment, we put those vulnerabilities back into the
model to study the difference in performance. This experiment is similar to the
experiment performed by Bullough et al. [3] with the caveat that their zero-day
vulnerabilities were removed from their baseline model.
In Figure 5, we see the relationship between precision and recall for both our
naive and realistic models when including zero-day exploits (blue lines) and our
baseline models which exclude zero-day exploits (orange lines). In Table 5, we
see the maximum F1 scores achieved by our models along with their respective
precision and recall values.
We observe that both our experimental models perform worse than the base-
line models. In Table 5, we observe that the naive and realistic model have F1
scores of 0.407 and 0.511 respectively when excluding zero-days compared to
0.284 and 0.391 when including zero-days.
The fact that our naive model perform worse when including zero-day exploits
is the opposite effect of what Bullough et al. observed. Moreover, the fact both
models showed worse performance indicates that the relative time frame is not
likely the cause of our result being different from Bullough et al.’s observations.
We think our results show the opposite due to our zero-day exploits not making
up the majority of our labels. In their case, their zero-day exploits make up
approximately 90%1 of their total number of exploits. In comparison, zero-day
exploits make up approximately 27% of our exploits in the naive model and 30%
1 This percentage is estimated from Figure 5 in their report[3].
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in the realistic model. When the zero-day exploits were removed from Bullough
et al.’s model, their class balance went from 17% to about 1.4%. In such a
scenario, a significant performance decrease should be expected.
A possible explanation to why our performance is decreased when including
zero-days is that those vulnerabilities are of a different class, i.e. their represen-
tations in the data are different than vulnerabilities that were exploited after
publication.
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Fig. 5. Performance comparison of our naive model (a) and our realistic model (b)
when including zero-day exploits in the data.
Table 5. Comparison of including zero-days for the naive, realistic and the results
from Bullough et al. [3]. Values of precision and recall have been chosen to maximize
the F1 score.
Naive Realistic Bullough et al.
Baseline Experiment Baseline Experiment Baseline Experiment
Precision 0.525 0.335 0.578 0.352 0.171 0.519
Recall 0.333 0.247 0.458 0.440 0.027 0.334
F1 Score 0.407 0.284 0.511 0.391 0.046 0.406
4.3 Experiment II: Temporal Intermixing
When using supervised learning on models that exhibit concept drift (see Sec-
tion 2.2), one needs to keep the training and test sets temporally separated to
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establish the performance of the model when applied to new samples. This ex-
periment will test if the data used for predicting exploits shows signs of concept
drift. To test this, we compare a temporally separated training and test set with
temporally intermixed training and test set using d′ = 2017-08-08 as the separat-
ing day between the training and the test set. The amount of concept drift will
be the difference in performance between the intermixed and separated model.
As computed from the Table 7, the naive model has a 43.0% relative increase
in maximum F1 score, and the realistic model showed a 25.1% relative increase
in F1 score. These results indicate that both the naive and realistic models
are prone to concept drift. For comparison, Bullough et al.’s model achieved
a performance gain of 782.6% [3]. In the following paragraphs, we list three
differences in our models that are likely to have contributed to the vast difference
in performance gain between our models and the ones of Bullough et al.
Class balance: Some of the difference in performance between the baseline
model and the experiment is due to a difference in class balance between the test
sets of the baseline model and the experiment. To highlight this difference, we
have included a ∆ column in Table 6, which shows the difference in class balance
between the regular model and the experiment in relative percentage. Bullough
et al. [3] report a ∆ = 55.7%2. Looking at the realistic model, we observe a
∆ = 23.0% for the test set. The extreme concept drift from Bullough et al.’s
experiment should be partially attributed to their ∆ being significantly higher
than our realistic model.
Absolute time frame: Since we use data that span 3 years (January 2015
to February 2018) our model has less time for concept drift to occur, compared
to Bullough et al. [3] whose data span 6 years (2009 to 2015). Thus, Bullough et
al.’s larger absolute time frame could be a possible explanation for their model
exhibiting concept drift much larger than ours.
Relative time frame: When comparing the concept drift between the naive
and realistic models, we are effectively comparing how the aggregation time
frame of each sample impacts concept drift. As mentioned earlier, the naive
model is more prone to concept drift than the realistic. This means that both
the absolute time frame and relative time frame affect concept drift.
Table 6. Properties of our training and test sets for the naive and realistic models when
randomly sampling their respective observations. The ∆ column shows the relative
difference in percentage of samples from the baseline model to the experiment model.
Samples
Naive Realistic
Baseline ∆ Experiment Baseline ∆ Experiment
Exploits
Total 757 (2.86%) 0% 757 (2.86 %) 842 (3.3 %) 0 % 842 (3.36 %)
Dropped 354 (1.33%) -100% 0 (0 %) 66 (0.03%) -22.7% 51 (0.02 %)
Train 310 (1.85%) 43.0 % 548 (2.88%) 656 (3.59%) -4.3 % 686 (3.36 %)
Test 93 (1.74%) 42.8 % 144 (2.72%) 120 (2.33%) 23.0 % 156 (3.05 %)
2 The ∆ was computed from their reported class percentage of their test set which was
16.7% in their random split experiment and 9.3% in their temporally split model.
Data Modelling for Predicting Exploits 13
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
lllll
lll
l
ll
l
lll
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll llllllllllllll
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
llllll
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
llllllllllllllllllll
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Recall
Pr
ec
is
io
n
l lWith Temporal Intermixing Without Temporal Intermixing
Naive Model (a)
lllllllllllllllllllllllllll
lllll
l
l
ll
l
llllll
l
ll
l
l
lll
lll
lll
llllllllllllllllllllllll
llllll
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
lllllllllllll
lll
llllllllllllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Recall
Pr
ec
is
io
n
l lWith Temporal Intermixing Without Temporal Intermixing
Realistic Model (b)
Fig. 6. Performance comparison of our naive model (a) and our realistic model (b) of
splitting training and test sets temporally and using random sampling of training and
test.
Table 7. The classifier results from the maximum F1 score when doing temporal
intermixing of training and test sets. We included results from previous research for
comparison as well as a model that does not use temporal intermixing [3, 12, 5].
Naive Realistic [3] [12] [5]
Baseline Experiment Baseline Experiment Baseline Experiment Experiment Experiment
Precision 0.525 0.664 0.578 0.801 0.171 0.519 ≈ 0.20 0.8158
Recall 0.333 0.770 0.458 0.594 0.027 0.334 ≈ 0.70 0.8302
F1 Score 0.407 0.713 0.511 0.682 0.046 0.406 0.31 0.8229
4.4 Experiment III: Excluding Web Chatter
In this experiment we remove any features from our data set that relate to web
chatter data. The reason for this experiment is to determine the role of web
chatter’s impact on our predictions. Previous work by Bullough et al. showed
that including web chatter features had negligible impact on the performance of
their model. To test this result, we designed similar models which excludes the
web chatter feature group from our data frames, and compare performance of the
resulting classifiers with their respective baseline models (naive and realistic).
In Figure 7a, we observe that excluding web chatter (blue line) from the
naive model achieves higher precision for recall values in the range 0 to ≈ 0.60.
This means that the naive model benefits from excluding web chatter. However,
as seen in Figure 7b, excluding web chatter (blue line) in the realistic model
achieves considerably worse precision for recall values in the range 0.25 and ≈ 1.
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This result indicates that the web chatter features are adding irrelevant in-
formation under the naive model. Conversely, the realistic model’s performance
decreased significantly when excluding web chatter features. This result indi-
cates that the web chatter has a positive impact under the realistic data model.
Finally, when comparing the performance of the naive model excluding web chat-
ter (blue line in Figure 7a), to the realistic model including web chatter (orange
line 7b), we observe that the realistic data model still makes better predictions.
This result indicates that the information disseminated during the early days of
a vulnerability is enough to make the best exploit prediction possible.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
lllll
lll
l
ll
l
lll
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll llllllllllllll
l l llll l l llll l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
lll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
lllllllllll
lllll
l
llllllllllllllll llll lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll llllllllll ll ll
llllllllllllllllll lllllll
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Recall
Pr
ec
is
io
n
l lWithout Web Chatter With Web Chatter
Naive Model (a)
lllllllllllllllllllllllllll
lllll
l
l
ll
l
llllll
l
ll
l
l
lll
lll
lll
llllllllllllllllllllllll
llllll
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
ll
llll
l
l
l
l
llllllllllll
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll llllllllll llllllllllllllllll
llll lllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllll ll l
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Recall
Pr
ec
is
io
n
l lWithout Web Chatter With Web Chatter
Realistic Model (a)
Fig. 7. Performance comparison of models that exclude web chatter features with the
baseline models.
Table 8. The classifier results from the maximum F1 score on the test set when using
web chatter. We included results from previous research for comparison as well as a
model that does not use temporal intermixing.
Realistic Naive Bullough et al.
Baseline Experiment Baseline Experiment Experiment Baseline
Precision 0.525 0.740 0.578 0.777 0.466 0.426
Recall 0.333 0.430 0.458 0.291 0.342 0.311
F1 Score 0.407 0.544 0.511 0.424 0.394 0.359
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5 Discussion
In Section 4.3, we observed that the model exhibited concept drift during the
time period 2015 to 2018. When a model exhibits concept drift, its ability to
predict new samples degrades over time. This result corroborates the results of
Bullough et al. who first made this discovery in 2017 [3]. Knowing more about
when and how concept drift occurs would not only benefit predictive models for
exploits but could yield insight about trends in exploit development.
The drastic decrease in percentage of zero-day exploits, from ≈ 90% of all
exploits published during the time period 2009 to 2015 [3] to about 30% during
2015 to early 2018, indicates that concepts or labels vary over time. This makes
individual studies difficult to compare. However, when we included zero-day
exploits in our model, we observed a decrease in performance which was the
opposite of what previous research observed [3]. A possible explanation for this
decrease is that zero-day exploits constitute a third class and introduce confusion
to our model when trying to fit the new class with the larger exploit class.
Our results show that having a smaller relative time of aggregation can re-
duce concept drift for a fixed absolute time frame. However, we never compare
different absolute time frames. It is possible that the effect of the relative time
frame has been exaggerated since the absolute time frame is still large. Untan-
gling the problem of the relative and absolute time frame’s impact on concept
drift is an interesting line of inquiry, that has practical implications for when
the model needs to be retrained, and is left for future work.
The utility of any predictive model is contingent on its quality of labels.
Exploit DB is known to contain many proof of concept exploits which usually
require advanced skills to be used in attacks against a system. Therefore, Exploit
DB’s credibility as a proxy for real world exploits is questionable. For any model
to have real world application, its ground truth needs to be upgraded or treated
differently to reflect real world threats.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the feasibility of predicting exploits using a realis-
tic model of aggregating data. Through this model, we have found two conflicting
results to those presented by Bullough et al. [3]. We found that open web data
increases the predictive power of exploits and that using zero-day vulnerabil-
itieshas a negative impact on exploits. We also learned that the data in this
domain has undergone concept drift during the time period between January
2015 and February 2018. This result is in agreement with those of Bullough et
al. [3] which means that more effort have to be devoted to understand when
concept drift occurs to make timely updates of models that predict exploits.
Our main finding in this paper is that to make realistic predictions on vulner-
abilities, it is imperative to use a model that reflects the early state of knowledge
of vulnerabilities. This is likely the information that exploit developers use to
decide which vulnerabilities to focus their attention on.
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